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Abstract
In the context of detection of speaker recognition identity im-
personation, we observed that the waveform probability mass
function (PMF) of genuine speech differs from significantly of
of PMF from identity theft extracts. This is true for synthe-
sized or converted speech as well as for replayed speech. In this
work, we mainly ask whether this observation has a significant
impact on spoofing detection performance. In a second step,
we want to reduce the distribution gap of waveforms between
authentic speech and spoofing speech. We propose a genuiniza-
tion of the spoofing speech (by analogy with Gaussianisation),
i.e. to obtain spoofing speech with a PMF close to the PMF of
genuine speech. Our genuinization is evaluated on ASVspoof
2019 challenge datasets, using the baseline system provided
by the challenge organization. In the case of constant Q cep-
stral coefficients (CQCC) features, the genuinization leads to a
degradation of the baseline system performance by a factor of
10, which shows a potentially large impact of the distribution
os waveforms on spoofing detection performance. However,
by ‘’playing” with all configurations, we also observed differ-
ent behaviors, including performance improvements in specific
cases. This leads us to conclude that waveform distribution
plays an important role and must be taken into account by anti-
spoofing systems.
Index Terms: anti-spoofing, waveform, probability mass func-
tion (PMF); CQCC, LFCC, GMM.
1. Introduction
In recent years the sensitivity of speaker recognition to spoofing
attacks and the development of spoofing countermeasures raised
an increasing interest, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. In the field of voice au-
thentication area, the most common threats come from replay-
ing recorded utterances, voice synthesis and voice conversion.
Associated countermeasures are generally composed of a spe-
cific additional system capable of separating true exmaple of
speech and spoofing examples, regardless of the type of spoof-
ing attacks. Different approaches are applied, [7, 8, 9, 10]. One
of the main differences between these approaches (as well as
between speaker recognition and spoofing detection) is related
to the feature extraction. Different features were proposed for
anti-spoofing systems [9]. The most promising seem to be con-
stant Q cepstral coefficients (CQCC) [7] which are a non-linear
extension of the linear frequency Cepstral coefficients (LFCC).
Most of the proposed features are based on short-term spectral
conversion (e.g., mel–frequency cepstral coefficients (MFCC)
and CQCC) and ignore the time domain. There are few excep-
tions, and even when the time domain is in interesting, it is only
used as a pre-processing step followed by short-term spectral
analysis. [11] filters the voice excitation source in order to esti-
mate the residual signal and uses it together with the frequency
domain information inside a Gaussian mixture model (GMM)-
based classifier; [12] applies cochlear filtering and nerve spike
density perform a short-term spectral analysis.
Spectral features are commonly used not only for counter-
measures, but also in many speech conversion systems [13, 14,
15, 16] and synthesis algorithms [17, 18].
This apparent lack of interest in time domain information
is surprising as time domain information is well known for
its richness, particularly, but not exclusively, for voice qual-
ity parameter estimation and pathological voice assessment
[19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24]. It seems straightforward that at least
voice quality parameters are important for genuine vs spoofing
speech separation. If time domain is mainly ignored in spoof-
ing countermeasure, this is certainly more related to the intrinsic
difficulty of time-domain approaches than to a lack of informa-
tion at this level.
To overcome this limitation, we wish to start by exploiting
simple representations of time-domain related information. In
previous works, we explored the entropy of waveform coeffi-
cients. In [25] and [26] it has been shown that entropy parame-
ters can be applied successfully to detect the overlap of speech
between two speakers. In [27], we successfully applied a simi-
lar approach to database assessment. In both cases, it was found
that this simple or oversimple representation of time domain in-
formation provided interesting information, clearly omitted by
conventional approaches based on short-term spectra-based.
In some of the experiments on the detection of speech fal-
sification, we examine, somewhat by chance, the global proba-
bility mass functions (PMFs) of the genuine speech recordings
versus the spoofing speech recordings (for all the cases, syn-
thesized, converted or replayed). We were surprised by the big
differences observed. This work is based on this observation
and further explores the role of waveform amplitudes’ PMFs
in spoofing speech detection. We propose to correct the im-
balanced observed between the PMFs of genuine speech and
spoofing speech. For this, we propose a process inspired from
the Gaussianization of the MFCC features proposed by [28],
applied at the waveform coefficient level and noted by analogy
genuinization. We examine the effect of our genuinization pro-
cess when it applies to different types of spoofing speech and
genuine speech. We also investigate the behavior of genuiniza-
tion on high and low energized part of the speech signal and on
spoofing detection system training set. In this work we use the
ASVspoof 2019 challenge [29] train and the development sets
as well as the baseline system provided by the challenge.
2. Databases
As presented in the previous section, we use in this article the
data composed of the ASVspoof 2019 challenge [29] genuine
(Bona fide) and logical conditions (speech synthesis and voice
conversion techniques). A summary of the different datasets is
presented in Table 1.
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Table 1: Logical condition databases.
#Speakers #Utterances
Subset Male Female Bona fide Spoof
Training 8 12 2, 580 22, 800
Development 8 12 5, 400 48, 600
We use also training data of the Physical condition (re-
played speech) but only in order to compute and show the cor-
responding waveform PMF, in the next section. In this chal-
lenge, the conditions were simulated both for the recorded room
acoustic conditions (27 different conditions) and for replay de-
vices (9 different configurations). The Physical train dataset is
summarized in Table 2. For both Logical and Physical condi-
tions, the vast majority of the recordings is 1 − 6 seconds in
duration.
Table 2: Physical condition train databases.
#Speakers #Utterances
Subset Male Female Bona fide Spoof
Training 8 12 2, 580 22, 800
3. PMFs of genuine and spoofing speech
The audio files of ASVspoof 2019 have 16 bits per sample. To
compute a given PMF, we take all the audio files and extract the
corresponding 216 bins frequency histogram. Figures 1 and 2
show the PMF of, respectively, training files of logical condition
(synthesized or converted speech) and training files of physical
condition (replayed speech). In both cases, PMF of the genuine
speech (Bona fide) is also provided for comparison purposes.
All PMFs are calculated using all speech samples (speech activ-
ity detection is not applied). It appears clearly that spoofed data
PMF has a much sharper pick close to the origin. This effect
is more accentuated for physical condition than for synthesized
and converted speech (logical condition).
Figure 1: Waveform amplitude PMFs for logical condition,
train set, Genuine (a) and Spoofing (b) speech (no VAD).
In spoofing detection domain, non-speech parts are known
to be informative [30] so usually voice activity detection is not
Figure 2: Waveform amplitude PMFs for physical condition,
train set, Genuine (a) and Spoofing (b) speech (no VAD).
applied. To confirm this fact, we display in Figure 3 informa-
tion similar to that in Figure 1 but with PMFs computed only
on speech parts when Figure 4 proposes the PMFs of the non-
speech parts (both experiments are using the same VAD pro-
cess). We apply a very simple energy VAD, using the same ap-
proach as in [31] and [32]. When there is almost no difference
between genuine and spoofing speech PMFs for the speech part,
a significant difference is observed for the non-speech part. This
observation confirms that non-speech is of great importance for
current spoofing speech detection systems and raises the ques-
tion whether this detection is really based on speech character-
istics or on non-speech artifacts.
Figure 3: Waveform amplitude PMFs for logical condition,
train set, Genuine (a) and Spoofing (b) speech, speech part only
(after applying VAD).
4. Genuinization process
With the two PMFs, one for genuine speech and the other for a
single recording of spoofing speech, the genuinization process
wishes to correct the amplitudes of the spoofing speech sam-
ples to obtain a PMF as close as possible to PMF of genuine
speech. Given the waveform amplitudes PMF of the genuine
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Figure 4: Waveform amplitude PMFs for logical condition,
train set, Genuine (a) and Spoofing (b) speech, non speech part
only (after applying VAD).
speech pgx (k), where g means genuine; x is a discrete ran-
dom variable x ∈ {1, . . . , 216}; k is the value that assigned
to x (the actual signal’s amplitude is s (n) = −1 + k · 2−15.
Next, the cumulative distribution function (CDF) is calculated,
F gx (k) =
∑k
q=1 p
g
x (q). For each spoofing speech signal s (n)
a PMF psx (k) (s for the spoofed signal) is calculated, followed
by the corresponding CDF F sx (k). The genuinization algorithm
is then applied, as described in 1.
Algorithm 1 Genuanization algorithm
Require:
Given a spoofing file, s (n) . n = 1, . . . , N
Be the genuinized file, sˆ (n)
Genuine CDF F gx (k) . k ∈ 1, . . . , 216
Spoofing file CDF F sx (k)
for k := 1 to N step 1 do
Set k = [s (n) + 1] 215.
Find q∗ = arg
q
{F gx (q) = F sx (k)}
Set sˆ (n) = −1 + 2−15 · q∗
Return: sˆ (n)
5. Experiments using Genuinization
The following experiments are done on all samples, without us-
ing a VAD process. Figure 5 presents, for logical condition, the
comparison of the PMFs of genuine speech, spoofing speech
before genuinization and after genuinization. The Figures em-
phasize a narrow band of amplitudes to facilitate comparisons.
The correction of the PMF looks significant. However, this does
not mean that this process is able to improve the quality of the
spoofing speech or make it more difficult to detect. Subjec-
tively, by listening to several recordings, we think that spoofing
files of poor quality sound even worse after genuinization while
for high quality recordings, no degradation is perceived. As far
as genuine files are concerned, the application of genuinization
has no noticeable effect, according to our subjective opinions.
In the following paragraph, we evaluate the effect of gen-
uinization for spoofing speech detection, using the provided
baseline system. Two feature sets are evaluated, LFCC and
Figure 5: Waveform amplitude PMFs for logical condition,
train set, original spoofing speech (upper), spoofing speech af-
ter genuinized (middle) and genuine speech (bottom).
CQCC. The GMMs have 512 mixture components. Spoofing
speech detection performance is computed on ASVspoof 2019
development dataset in terms of EER and min-tDCF [29].
Table 3: Spoofing detection performance using original or gen-
uinized test files.
Original Genuinized
LFCC
EER [%] 2.709 1.291
min-tDCF 0.0663 0.0367
CQCC
EER [%] 0.394 3.219
min-tDCF 0.0112 0.0992
Table 4: Spoofing detection performance using genuinization to
train spoofing model and original or genuinized test files.
Original Genuinized
LFCC
EER [%] 34.379 0.048
min-tDCF 0.6304 0.0015
CQCC
EER [%] 43.477 0.007
min-tDCF 0.8910 0.0001
Table 3 shows the results with spoofing GMM model learned
on original training data. With CQCC features, applying gen-
uinization to spoofing test data increases the EER by 10 times.
It seems to indicate that CQCC features, which are performing
about 9 times better than LFCC without genuinization, are also
more linked to waveform amplitudes information. For LFCC,
genuinization seems to have a positive effect, with an EER
downsized from 2.7% (no genuinization) to 1.29% (with gen-
uinization). The latter result tends to say that LFCC features
are less linked to time domain waveform information, so gen-
uinization corresponds here to a classical feature normalization
step. As the physical condition experiments do not show the
same behavior, more experiments with different conditions are
required before we can propose a definitive conclusion.
Table 4 presents the results of a similar experiment, but after
applying genuinization to train the spoofing GMM. For CQCC,
the EER is 43% without and about 0% with genuinization ap-
plied on the files. For LFCC, applying genuinization on spoof-
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ing model destroys performance on original test data where the
EER drops close to 0 when applied on genuinization spoofing
test data. Both results tend to confirm our hypotheses about the
role of waveform amplitudes for MFCC and CQCC.
We aim in the next paragraphs to evaluate whether our gen-
uinization process is sensitive to the speech/non-speech ques-
tion. To evaluate this sensitivity, we propose to compute our
genuinization parameters on non-speech parts only, so only the
non-speech parts of the signals are used to compute the CDF
of the genuine speech on the training set. Then, for the spoof-
ing files of the train and development sets, the procedure de-
scribed in Algorithm 1 is classically applied (in other words,
we changed the targeted distribution, which is now computed
only on non-speech data).
Figure 6: Waveform amplitude PMFs for logical condition,
train set, original spoofing speech (upper), spoofing speech af-
ter non-speech-based genuinized (middle) and genuine speech
(bottom).
Figure 6 presents the PMFs of genuine speech, original
spoofing speech and spoofing speech after this ”non speech-
only” genuinization. The PMF after genuinization is far from
being identical to the genuine speech PMF. It is very clear when
Figure 6 is compared with Figure 5, where the PMF after gen-
uinization was clearly closer to the genuine speech PMF. This
is explained by the heavier tails of spoofing speech, particularly
the left tail, as showed in Figure 7.
Table 5 presents an experiment close to the one presented
in Table 3 but where the genuinization parameters are learnt on
non-speech data. The results confirm our previous findings for
CQCC, with an EER multiplied by a factor of 4. For LFCC,
the results are less clear where for the non-speech case we see a
degradation of the EER by about 1.2.
Table 5: Spoofing detection performance using original or gen-
uinized test files, with genuinization parameters estimated on
non speech parts.
Original Genuinized
LFCC
EER [%] 2.709 3.374
min-tDCF 0.0663 0.0941
CQCC
EER [%] 0.394 1.577
min-tDCF 0.0112 0.0431
Figure 7: CDFs of the Logical conditions train set waveform
amplitudes for the Genuine and Spoofing speech.
6. Conclusions
In this work, we investigated the role of time-domain informa-
tion both for speaker recognition spoofing attacks and spoofing
countermeasures questions. Our interest is motivated by the fact
that classical spoofing/anti-spoofing approaches usually neglect
this domain and focus mainly on the frequency domain.
To start with a simple approach in the time domain, we pro-
posed to exploit the PMFs of the waveform amplitudes. We
have shown that for both problems, spoofing and anti-spoofing,
more attention should be paid to time domain since large dif-
ferences in waveform amplitudes PMFs have been observed be-
tween genuine and spoofing speech.
Based on this finding, we haved proposed a simple gen-
uinization method capable of transforming the spoofing speech
to reduce the waveform amplitudes PMF gap between genuine
and spoofing speech.
Furthermore, when we examined the performance of
ASVspoof 2019 challenge baseline system using LFCC or
CQCC features, we found that the system was vulnerable to
the time domain changes achieved using genuinization process.
This is especially true for CQCC features, which appear very
sensitive to waveform amplitudes information. We can not gen-
eralize it to all anti-spoofing systems, but we can assume that at
least some of them are also vulnerable to time domain changes.
Another observation is that the largest PMF difference be-
tween genuine and spoofing speech takes place in low ampli-
tudes area, which is mainly linked to non-speech. This result
may explain why VAD is rarely used in anti-spoofing systems.
To conclude, to the best of our knowledge, it is one of the
first works which uses the waveform amplitudes distribution to
analyze genuine speech versus spoofing speech. Even if our
method is simple, maybe oversimple, it allows us to open a large
number of questions. We also plan to examine the effects on
the replayed speech and see how our genuinization idea can be
applied as pre-processing, before replaying the data, in order to
reduce the gap between genuine speech and replayed speech.
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